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1 Introduction
The Spanish spot market for electricity was introduced in 1998. As in many other elec-
tricity markets, there is a high concentration index together with an inelastic demand,
and these features suggest that rms will use their market power to set prices well above
costs. However, depending on other market conditions; electricity auction rules, or in-
centives provided by the regulator, concentration coupled with a low demand elasticity
may give rise to higher or lower margins. Wolfram (1999) found that for the British
market prices were much closer to marginal cost than most theories predicted, although
she also nds some evidence of strategic capacity withholding. Explanations for the re-
strained price levels were nancial contracts between the suppliers and their customers,1
threat of entry and threat of regulatory intervention in the market.2
In this paper we explore rst whether generatorsbidding behavior at the Spanish
wholesale market is consistent with prot maximization on the residual demand. We
obtain the hourly residual demand for each generator and compute both the revenue-
maximizing price-quantity pairs as well as the prot-maximizing price-quantity pairs.
For the larger generators, these prices turn out to be consistently higher than the ob-
served prices, whereas for smaller generators the di¤erences are not signicant.
Hortacsu and Puller (2004) have analyzed competition on the newly deregulated
electricity market in Texas. They use data on demand, rm level bids and marginal cost
and compare actual bids to theoretical ex-post optimal bids; their results indicate that
the largest seller o¤ered bids close to ex-post optimal bids, while smaller sellers seem
to deviate from optimal behavior. Wolak (2003) measured unilateral market power for
the California real-time energy market using measures of the inverse of the elasticity
of residual demand. For the Australian electricity market, Wolak (2000) studied the
impact of nancial hedge contracts on generatorsbidding behavior.
Besides market concentration and demand elasticity, there are other features of the
Spanish wholesale market which could potentially a¤ect rmsincentives for price setting.
In the Spanish pool, generators get subsidies (CTCs, costs of transition to competition)
and the way those subsidies are distributed a¤ects rmsincentives to raise prices. Ca-
pacity payments may also a¤ect the generators incentives. A third factor is vertical
1See Green (1999) on contracts for di¤erences.
2However, Newbery (2002) argues that many European countries lack the necessary regulatory power
to mitigate generator market power.
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integration. The Spanish electricity market is vertically integrated, so that larger gen-
erators are also large buyers in the pool. This feature might also be a signicant factor
mitigating the incentives for rms to keep pool prices high.3 Unlike other electricity
markets, hedge contracts are quantitatively unimportant in the Spanish market. All
these market features a¤ect the market power that rms will e¤ectively exert so that
the observed price cost margin, the efective market power, will be determined not only
by market concentration and demand elasticity but also by regulatory rules, vertical
integration and other factors.
It is di¢ cult to measure how these factors will a¤ect price-cost margins. Our purpose
in this paper is to measure each generators potential market power, dened here as the
price-cost margin compatible with prot maximization: the inverse of the elasticity of
the residual demand. In fact, the comparison between actual price-cost margins and
the Lerner index compatible with prot maximization would give us an idea of the
importance of other factors apart from demand elasticity or supply concentration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model for the optimal bidding
behavior of the generators at the pool. Since bids are short-lived in the Spanish market
and generators are allowed to present up to 25 price-quantity pairs for each production
unit, the rules allow enough exibility so that the equilibrium price and quantity sold
should be ex-post optimal. Section 3 describes the empirical implementation. On sec-
tions 4 and 5 we check whether actual bids match that optimal bidding behavior. First
we nd a lower bound for the pools hourly price when generators maximize revenues
on their residual demand. Then we calculate the ex-post optimal price. This price is
decreasing over time for large generators due to the entry of new competitors in the
market, on the supply side, and the entry of new consumers bidding, on the demand
side (demand elasticity has been increasing over time). Section 6 concludes.
2 Prot maximization hypothesis
In the Spanish pool, rms submit short-lived bids for each plant (the bids for each of
the 24 hours of the following day may be di¤erent). Aggregating the bids of all plants
under the ownership of a generator we get its hourly supply schedule. Generators may
not know for sure their residual demand, although uncertainty cannot be very large.4
3See Kühn and Machado (2004) for an analysis of vertical integration in the Spanish wholesale market.
4García-Díaz and Marin (2003) argue that with short-lived bids the degree of uncertainty is very low.
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To maximize expected prots, for each possible residual demand realization, a generator
should o¤er an amount such that marginal revenue equals marginal cost. The pair (q; p)
so determined should be a point in its supply schedule. This procedure can continue
as long as the number of possible realization of residual demand is not higher than the
number of steps in the supply function (see Wolak, 2000, for the regularity conditions
that the distribution of the residual demand curve should satisfy)5. Then, the expected
prot maximizing supply schedule should pass through all ex-post prot maximizing
price and quantity pairs.
The implication is that for each realization of residual demand, bids will make mar-
ginal revenue equal to marginal cost. Tahe hour h, then:
Li =
ph   C 0ih
ph
=
1
"ih
(1)
where ph is the equilibrium price in hour h, C 0ih is the marginal cost for rm i at hour
h, "ih is the elasticity of the residual demand faced by rm i at hour h, and Li denotes
the Lerner index for each generator i. Note that if (1) did not hold for generator i, then
rm i could change its bid and increase its prots.
3 Empirical implementation
In the Spanish day-ahead market for electricity qualied buyers and sellers of electricity
present their o¤ers (before 11 a.m.) for each hour of the following day.
Sellers in the pool present bids consisting of up to 25 di¤erent prices and the corre-
sponding energy quantities for each of the 24 periods and for each generating unit they
own; the prices must be increasing.6 If no restriction is included in the o¤er this is called
a simple o¤er. A seller may also present a complex o¤erwhich may include indi-
visibility conditions, a minimum revenue condition, production capacity variation (load
gradient conditions) and scheduled stop conditions. The pool administrator consolidates
5From his analysis of the Australian market and the California market Wolak (2003) concludes that
rms were not overly constrained by the market rules from setting the prot maximizing price. The
Spanish pool is even less contrained: for each generating unit the supply schedule may have 25 steps,
instead of 10, and prices may be changed on an hourly basis.
6According to the Electricity Market Activity Rules, p. 6, generators shall be required to submit
electric power sale bids to the market operator for each of the production units they own for each and
every one of the hourly scheduling periods.
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the sales bids for each hourly period to generate an aggregate supply curve.
Qualied buyers in the pool present o¤ers.7 Purchase bids state a quantity and a
price of a power block and there can be as many as 25 power purchasing blocks for the
same purchasing unit, with di¤erent prices for each block; the prices must be decreasing.
The pool administrator constructs an aggregate demand with these o¤ers.
In a session of the day-ahead market the pool administrator combines these o¤ers
matching demand and supply for each of the 24 hourly periods and determines the
equilibrium price for each period (the system marginal price) and the amount traded.
After this matching is settled, the pool administrator evaluates the technical feasibility
of the assignment; if the required technical restrictions are met then the program is
feasible; if not, some previously accepted o¤ers are eliminated and others included to
obtain a feasible assignement. There is also an intra-day market to make any necessary
adjustments between demand and supply.
Table 1 summarizes the total capacity owned as well as the share of total generation,
by company and type of technology in 2004.
Table 1. Generation Capacity by Type of Technology and Firm (MW)1
EN IB UF HC VI GN RP Others TOTAL
Nuclear 3574:6 3254:7 740:6 165:2 0 0 0 0 7735:1
Coal-burning 5519:7 1217 2035 625 867:8 0 0 0 10234:5
Oil-red 2659 3193 770 887 753 0 0 0 8262
Combined cycle 1327:1 2637:2 1200 413:4 13:4 1600 200 2498:9 9890
Hydroelectric 5366:6 8372:4 1678:3 410:3 629 0 0 9 16465:8
1Renewable resources not included. Source: OMEL, own calculations.
Two companies, Endesa (EN) and Iberdrola (IB), own the majority of generating
capacity, while Unión Fenosa (UF) and Hidrocantábrico (HC) are smaller competitors;
all are private companies and each owns nuclear, thermal plants and hydroelectric units.
7From January 1st 2003, all buyers of electricity are considered qualied buyers. Before that date
qualied buyers were those with consumption greater or equal to 1 GWh per year. The required con-
sumption has decreased over time from 5GWh (December 1998) to 3GWh (April 1999), to 2GWh (July
1999) and to 1 GWh (October 1999).
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Capacity has remained the same in coal-burning and oil-red plants. There has only
been addition of new capacity in combined cycle plants, and also in renewable resources.
At the beginning of 2002, EN sold a small part of its capacity, Viesgo, to the Italian
company ENEL, which has become the fth competitor in the market. During 2002 and
2003 there has been entry in small scale (mainly Repsol and Gas Natural).
Figure 1 illustrates a typical demand and supply functions.
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The system marginal price is 4:536 ce/kWh and the market clearing quantity is
23253:5 MWh. Note that there is a horizontal segment which mostly corresponds to the
electricity demand by nal consumers paying a regulated tari¤. Since demand for those
consumers cannot react to pool prices, bids for this consumption are made at the price
cap, 18:030 c/kWh.
Other consumers however choose to present bids with the corresponding demand
price. It is this part of demand which is of interest in this paper since we are trying
to relate elasticity of demand and market power. For this reason we have ignored the
horizontal initial segment of demand and focus on the price elastic segment. To do that
we just change the origin, for the demand and supply schedules, to the rst bid at a price
lower than 18 ce/kWh. In Figure 1, the new origin would be at around 9000 MWh.
For each generator i we need to calculate the value of elasticity of residual demand
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evaluated at the equilibrium price, "ri (ph) for each hour h. We have data on individual
hourly bids for each plant. First we add the bids for all plants under the ownership of a
given generator to obtain the supply schedule of each generator i for hour h. Demand
bids are also available so that we have aggregate market demand for each hour h.
The hourly residual demand for i is calculated by substracting from the aggregate
demand the supply of all generators but i. This residual demand schedule will be denoted
Dri (p).
To compute the slope of the residual demand around the equilibrium price (calculated
according to the market rules), we nd the closest price above ph such that the residual
demand is lower than the value at ph and denote that price ph. Similarly, we nd the
closest price below ph such that the residual demand is higher than the value at ph and
denote that price p
h
. Then, we can calculate the arc elasticity of residual demand for
generator i for each hour h as:
"ri (ph) =  
Dri (ph) Dri (ph)
ph   ph
ph + ph
Dri (ph) +D
r
i (ph)
(2)
Another possibility is to x the length x of the arc (for example 10 MW) and
compute the price ph such that residual demand is lower in an amount x and the price
p
h
such that residual demand is higher in an amount x. We will use this procedure for
several values of x to compute the arc elasticity.
The data consists of hourly demand and supply bids for each agent and for each
production and demand unit, in the day-ahead electricity wholesale market from May
2001 until December 2004. The hours are classied in peak, o¤-peak 1 and o¤-peak 2
hours (high, low and intermediate demand, respectively).8
We obtain the time series of inverse elasticities for each rm; EN, IB, UF, HC, and
VI. We have the following time series: the equilibrium prices ph,9 ph, ph, and for each
8Data are available from May 2001. Following a pool administrator classication, data are divided
into three categories:
Peak demand hours: From 16:00 to 22:00 week days (excluding holidays) in November, December,
January, and February. From 9:00 to 15:00 week days in March, April, July, and October.
O¤-peak 1 demand hours: From 0:00 to 8:00 every day of the year, plus Saturdays, Sundays, and
holidays. August is also included.
O¤-peak 2 demand hours: From 6:00 to 16:00 and from 22:00 to 00:00, week days in November,
December, January, and February. From 8:00 to 9:00, and from 15:00 to 00:00, week days in March,
April, July, and October. From 8:00 to 00:00 week days in May, June, and September.
9We use equilibrium prices before and after technical restrictions. On the other hand, the market
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generator i, Dri (ph), D
r
i (ph). From expression (2) we calculate the hourly elasticity for
each generator "rih, and compute the inverse
1
"rih
. Since hourly deviations from the prot
maximization condition (1) are likely, we focus on the average values.
Table 2 summarizes the annual weighted average 1"rih
for the ve largest genera-
tors from 2001,to 2004 for three di¤erent choices of the arc: 0:1MWh, 1MWh and
10MWh.10
Table 2: Inverse elasticity of residual demand
day ahead market
Arc YEAR Firm
EN IB UF HC VI
2001 9:36 6:19 0:29 0:17
0:1MWh 2002 10:26 15:87 0:32 0:19 0:21
2003 4:33 2:65 0:38 0:24 0:11
2004 6:65 0:84 0:33 0:49 0:09
2001 1:81 1:88 0:27 0:17
1MWh 2002 1:28 2:03 0:29 0:19 0:11
2003 1:48 1:07 0:31 0:23 0:1
2004 1:69 0:53 0:27 0:21 0:07
2001 1:57 1:44 0:26 0:15
10MWh 2002 1:21 1:76 0:28 0:18 0:11
2003 1:34 0:91 0:29 0:22 0:09
2004 1:6 0:5 0:26 0:2 0:07
Table 2 suggests that the behavior of the two largest generators is not consistent
with the expected prot maximization hypothesis since we obtain inverse elasticities of
residual demand above one, regardless the type of hour and time period. There might be
several explanations why large generators do not submit prot maximizing bids. Before
turning to some of these explanations, we compute in the next two sections the revenue
operator sometimes rejects demand bids at a high price because they are unfeasible given the capacity
restrictions of the interconnections with the neighbor countries (there is a rationing procedure to assign
the interconnection capacity among bidders).
10The results for GN and RP do not di¤er much from VI since the capacity of generation is rather
small.
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maximizing bids and the prot maximizing bids to see whether these are far away from
the actual bids.
4 Revenue-maximizing price and quantity
We look for the price-quantity pair such that it maximizes the revenue of the rms,
where the revenue is dened over the residual demand under capacity constraints. This
is a rst approach and later on we approximate the prot- maximizing prices for each
rm. The revenue-maximizing prices are a lower bound for the optimal prices and have
the advantage of being independent of cost estimations. When there are generation
costs, prices can only be above the revenue-maximizing prices. The unique constraint
we must include is that the revenue-maximizing quantity is not above the total capacity
of generation available by the rm at any time period. Thus for each rm f and hour
h, we compute the solution to the following problem,
max
pfh
h
pfhD
r;f
h

pfh
i
s.t. qxh  Kx for x = fnu; co; fg; cc; hyg
Since we have demand schedules, the residual demands for each rm are also sched-
ules, therefore the maximization problem may not have solution or even if it does, it may
not be unique. We apply standard kernel estimation techniques to smooth the revenue
schedules and obtain a global maximum. Thus we compute the weighted average prices.
Results are reported in Table 3.
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Table 3: Revenue-maximizing prices
Period Type of Hour Firm SMP
EN IB UF HC VI GN RP
All hours 4:189 3:681 2:338 2:773 2:039 1:753 0:754 3:214
2001  2004 Peak 5:714 6:477 3:109 3:509 2:654 2:161 0:972 3:919
O¤-peak 1 5:148 5:075 2:958 3:429 2:465 2:114 0:894 3:805
O¤-peak 2 3:374 2:384 1:853 2:277 1:690 1:479 0:637 2:669
All hours 5:386 3:685 2:369 2:904 3:588
2001 Peak 8:124 7:792 3:730 4:154 4:948
O¤-peak 1 6:892 5:094 3:091 3:683 4:317
O¤-peak 2 4:205 2:360 1:797 2:318 2:873
All hours 4:704 5:091 2:743 3:265 3:156 1:728 3:868
2002 Peak 6:757 9:272 3:690 4:212 4:039 1:896 4:814
O¤-peak 1 5:719 7:129 3:470 4:012 3:860 2:073 4:567
O¤-peak 2 3:748 3:161 2:164 2:674 2:602 1:509 3:191
All hours 3:351 2:966 2:154 2:467 2:305 2:668 1:381 2:851
2003 Peak 4:289 4:763 2:696 2:965 2:726 3:146 1:601 3:268
O¤-peak 1 4:023 4:168 2:802 3:135 2:889 3:325 1:666 3:427
O¤-peak 2 2:798 1:955 1:696 2:007 1:905 2:217 1:184 2:367
All hours 3:035 2:006 1:754 2:118 1:935 2:371 2:095 2:754
2004 Peak 4:052 2:943 2:134 2:528 2:316 2:820 2:498 3:269
O¤-peak 1 3:676 2:402 1:924 2:361 2:075 2:663 2:412 3:177
O¤-peak 2 2:403 1:536 1:558 1:873 1:757 2:086 1:807 2:359
The prices in Table 3 suggest that larger generators consistently would maximize
revenues at higher prices than the observed system marginal price (SMPh). For smaller
generators the result is just the opposite: revenue-maximizing prices are below the SMPh.
5 Prot-maximizing price and quantity
In this section we consider the problem of prot maximization. We build a cost struc-
ture based on the unit cost of production of the di¤erent types of technologies used in
generation. In general the low cost technologies are hydroelectric and nuclear. The fuel
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gas and combined cycle come second in the merit order, followed by coal-burning plants.
Thus, the cost function is,
Cf

qfh

=
8>><>>:
0 if qfh = q
hy
h + q
nu
h ; q
hy
h  Khy; qnuh  Knu
cf1

qfgh + q
cc
h

if qfh = q
hy
h + q
nu
h + q
fg
h + q
cc
h ; q
fg
h  Kfg; qcch  Kcc
cf1

qfgh + q
cc
h

+ cf1 (q
co
h ) if q
f
h = q
hy
h + q
nu
h + q
fg
h + q
cc
h + q
co
h ; q
co
h  Kco
where hy stands for the energy produced from hydro resources, nu stands for nuclear,
fg for fuel-gas, cc for combined cycle, co for coal, Ki denotes capacity of the plant for
that type of technology.
Therefore the problem to solve is,
max
pfh;
pfhD
r;f
h

pfh

  Cf

Dr;fh

pfh

where the cost function is given in the above expression.
As it is widely recognized, it is a crucial problem to estimate cost functions. We
proceed by using di¤erent approaches to test the consistency of the results on prot-
maximizing prices obtained according to the cost schedule we use. First, we approximate
the cost function using screening curves for each type of technology. In a screening curve,
a technologys total generation cost per kilowatt-year of electricity is plotted against
di¤erent values of the capacity available by each plant. The generation cost includes
raw materials as well as another variable costs that increase with the power generated,
as well as xed costs (capital costs) that have to be recovered during a su¢ ciently long
period of time (usually 20 to 30 years). The capacity factor is the percentage of hours
that the plant runs during a given year. A plant of any type has low generation cost
if it operates many hours per year, since it allows to spread the xed cost among more
units of production.
Screening curves provides a comparisson for the use of di¤erent technologies for a
given capacity factor. The slope of the curve measures the increase in annual cost for
an increase in one unit of capacity use. Therefore since it is constant it can be used as
10
an approximation for the unit cost.of generation per year.
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Figure 1: Comparison of generation technologies
We include a picture with the screening curves for four types of technologies: nuclear,
coal, fuel-gas and combined cycle.
Results are reported in Table 3.
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Table 3: Average Prot-maximizing prices
Period Type of Hour Firm SMP
EN IB UF HC VI GN RP
2001  2004 All (32185) 6:525 6:168 3:151 3:137 3:118 4:093 4:022 3:214
Peak (3528) 8:321 9:046 3:866 3:76 3:638 4:235 4:202 3:919
O¤-peak 1 (9960) 8:016 8:15 3:735 3:693 3:581 4:161 4:197 3:805
O¤-peak 2 (18697) 5:391 4:568 2:705 2:724 2:773 4:030 3:895 2:669
2001 All (5881) 8:352 7:302 3:363 3:229 3:588
Peak (504) 11:886 12:122 4:648 4:339 4:948
O¤-peak 1 (1848) 10:441 9:565 4:064 3:917 4:317
O¤-peak 2 (3529) 6:754 5:429 2:812 2:754 2:873
2002 All (8760) 8:277 9:244 3:662 3:629 3:607 4:105 3:824 3:868
Peak (1014) 10:715 13:313 4:554 4:372 4:244 4:574 4:51 4:814
O¤-peak 1 (2698) 10:776 12:588 4:389 4:26 4:163 4:459 4:439 4:567
O¤-peak 2 (5048) 6:452 6:639 3:089 3:143 3:182 3:823 3:358 3:191
2003 All (8760) 5:124 5:006 2:939 2:951 2:968 4:541 4:282 2:851
Peak (1014) 6:955 7:372 3:46 3:354 3:222 4:25 4:095 3:268
O¤-peak 1 (2714) 6:218 6:581 3:502 3:465 3:342 4:347 4:248 3:427
O¤-peak 2 (5032) 4:166 3:679 2:53 2:591 2:716 4:703 4:338 2:367
2004 All (8784) 4:949 3:487 2:712 2:754 2:687 4:196 4:474 2:754
Peak (996) 5:471 4:896 3:183 3:256 3:034 3:767 3:872 3:269
O¤-peak 1 (2700) 5:404 4:323 3:081 3:2 2:955 3:791 4:039 3:177
O¤-peak 2 (5088) 4:605 2:795 2:423 2:418 2:478 4:495 4:823 2:359
We test whether the prot-maximizing prices for the rms are signicantly di¤erent
from the observed equilibrium prices. The null hypothesis of equal means is rejected
for EN, IB, GN and RP, but it is not rejected for UF, HC and VI. Note that the prot
maximizing price is decreasing over time due to the entry of new competitors.
6 Intraday-market Behavior
The intra-day market is the one for adjustments in the daily viable schedule through the
submittal of power sale and purchase bids to the market operator. It operates like the
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day-ahead market. A price is determined to clear the market. The market is divided
into at least six sessions. Bids can also be simple or complex as in the day-ahead market.
The demand schedule is constructed using bids from plants that do not fulll their
required levels of power to match their bids in the day-ahead market, whereas the supply
schedule is constructed using bids from
Figure 2 illustrates typical demand and supply functions.for the rst session.
[Insert gure 3]
In table 4 we report the inverse elasticities for the rst session of the intraday market,
which is the one with the highest power trade among the six markets.
Table 4: Inverse elasticity of residual demand, intra-day market
Arc YEAR FIRM
EN IB UF HC VI GN RP
2001 0:51 0:40 0:66 0:16      
0:1MWh 2002 0:68 1:09 0:68 0:33 0:38 0:38 0:38
2003 0:34 0:44 0:19 0:14 0:18 0:22 0:18
2004
2001 0:40 0:30 0:24 0:12      
1MWh 2002 0:55 0:52 0:30 0:28 0:36 0:35 0:36
2003 0:28 0:34 0:16 0:13 0:15 0:17 0:15
2004 0:25 0:17 0:10 0:06 0:06 0:07 0:06
2001 0:34 0:23 0:21 0:10      
10MWh 2002 0:42 0:39 0:21 0:20 0:24 0:23 0:23
2003 0:23 0:29 0:14 0:12 0:14 0:15 0:13
2004 0:21 0:15 0:08 0:05 0:05 0:06 0:05
Notice how.the inverse elasticities of the residual demand in the intra-day market are
below 1. This result follows from the fact that these markets represent a small fraction
of the total energy traded. Therefore, rms do not have the same incentives to exercise
market power as they have for large trades.
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7 Concluding Comments
Our results suggest that large rms do not submit prot-maximizing bids; higher system
marginal price would increase larger generators prots. Hortacsu and Puller (2004)
found the opposite result for the Texas market: In their case the largest seller o¤ered
bids which were consistent with prot maximization and smaller sellers seemed to deviate
from this behavior.
A major problem we face is to gather reliable data on costs. We use screening curves
as an initial approach because since the results are average yearly prices, it also seems
reasonable to consider cost data on a yearly basis that smooth the curve. We consider
the paper would not be entire satisfactory if we do not try di¤erent approaches to obtain
cost functions and then test the robustness of the prot-maximizing prices on residual
demands.
8 References
Hortacsu, Ali and Steven L. Puller (2004), Testing Strategic Models of Firm Behavior
in Restructured Electricity Markets: A Case Study of ERCOT, CSEM WP-125.
Borenstein, S., J. B. Bushnell, and F. A. Wolak, 2002, Measuring Market Ine¢ cien-
cies in Californias Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market,.The American Economic
Review 92, 5, p. 1376-1405.
Castro-Rodriguez, F., P. Marín and G. Siotis, 2001, Capacity Choices in Liberalized
Electricity Markets, CEPR Discussion Paper # 2998.
Delgado, M. A., 1993, Testing for the equality of nonparametric regression curves,
Statistics and Probability Letters 17, p. 199-204.
Fabra, N., 2001, Market Power in Electricity Markets, Ph. D. thesis, Department of
Economics, European University Institute, Florence.
Fabra, N., 2003, Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform versus Discrimina-
tory, The Journal of Industrial Economics 51, p. 271-294.
Fabra, N., von der Fehr and Harbord, 2002, Modeling Electricity Auctions, The
Electricity Journal.
Ferreira, E. and W. Stute, 2003, Testing for di¤erences between conditional means
in a time series context, Journal of the American Statistical Association.
García-Díaz, A. and Marín, P., 2003, Strategic Bidding in Electricity Pools with
14
Short-Lived Bids: An Application to the Spanish Market, International Journal of In-
dustrial Organization 21, 2, p. 201-222.
Green, R. and D. Newbury, 1992, Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market,
Journal of Political Economy 100, 5, p. 929-953.
Green, R., 1996, Increasing Competition in the British Electricity Market, Journal
of Industrial Economics 44, p. 205-216.
Hall, P. and Hart, J. D., 1990, Bootstrap test for di¤erence between means in non-
parametric regression, Journal of the American Statistical Association 85, p. 1039-1049.
Klemperer, 2002, What Really Matters in Auction Design, Journal of Economic
Perspectives 16, 1, p. 169-189.
Koul, H. and A. Schick, 1997, Testing for the equality of two nonparametric regression
curves, Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference 65, p. 293-314.
Kühn, K.-U. and M. Machado, 2003, Market Power and Vertical Integration in the
Spanish Electricity Market. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, mimeo.
Lerner, A. P., 1934, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly
Power, Review of Economic Studies, June, p. 157-175.
Mount, T., 2001, Market Power and Price Volatility in Restructured Markets for
Electricity, Decision Support Systems 30, 3, p. 311-325.
Newbury, D. M., 2002, Problems of liberalizing the electricity industry, European
Economic Review 46, p. 919-927.
Ocaña, C. and A. Romero, 1998, Una Simulación del Funcionamiento del Pool de
Energía Eléctrica en España, Documento de Trabajo DT 002/98, CNSE.
von der Fehr, N.-H. M. and D. Harbord, 1993, Spot Market Competition in the UK
Electricity Industry, Economic Journal, 103, 418, p. 531-546.
Wang J. J. D. and J. F. Zender, 2002, Auctioning Divisible Goods, Economic Theory
19, 4, p.673-705.
Wolak, F., 2003,
Wolfram, C., 1999, Measuring duopoly power in the British electricity spot market,
The American Economic Review, 89, 4, p. 805-827.
Wolfram, C., 1998, Strategic Bidding in a Multi-Unit Auction: An Empirical Analysis
of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales, Rand Journal of Economics 29, 4,
p. 703-725.
OMEL Electricity Market Activity Rules, April 2001.
15
9 Appendix1: The Spanish pool
The Spanish day-ahead market for electricity started its operations in January 1998.11
Everyday qualied buyers and sellers of electricity present their o¤ers for each hour of
the following day.
Sellers in the pool present bids consisting of up to 25 di¤erent prices and the cor-
responding energy quantities for each of the 24 periods and for each generating unit
they own; the prices must be increasing.12 If no restriction is included in the o¤er this is
called a simple o¤er. A seller may also present a complex o¤erwhich may include indi-
visibility conditions, a minimum revenue condition, production capacity variation (load
gradient conditions) and scheduled stop conditions. The pool administrator consolidates
the sales bids for each hourly period to generate an aggregate supply curve.
Qualied buyers in the pool present o¤ers.13 Purchase bids state a quantity and a
price of a power block and there can be as many as 25 power purchasing blocks for the
same purchasing unit, with di¤erent prices for each block; the prices must be decreasing.
The pool administrator constructs an aggregate demand with these o¤ers.
In a session of the day-ahead market the pool administrator combines these o¤ers
matching demand and supply for each of the 24 hourly periods and determines the
equilibrium price for each period (the system marginal price) and the amount traded.
After this matching is settled, the pool administrator evaluates the technical feasibility
of the assignment; if the required technical restrictions are met then the program is
feasible; if not, some previously accepted o¤ers are eliminated and others included to
obtain a feasible assignement. There is also an intra-day market to make any necessary
adjustments between demand and supply. There are at the most six sessions of the
intra-day market.
11After Act 54/1997 liberalizing the market was approved in November 1997 and Act 2019/1997
established the rules of the production market.
12According to the Electricity Market Activity Rules, p. 6, generators shall be required to submit
electric power sale bids to the market operator for each of the production units they own for each and
every one of the hourly scheduling periods.
13>From January 1st 2003, all buyers of electricity are considered qualied buyers. Before that
date qualied buyers were those with consumption greater or equal to 1 GWh per year. The required
consumption has decreased over time from 5GWh (December 1998) to 3GWh (April 1999), to 2GWh
(July 1999) and to 1 GWh (October 1999).
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10 Apéndice 2: Kernel densities review
A kernel density estimate is formed by summing the weighted values calculated with the
kernel density function K,
bfK = 1
nh
nX
i=1
K

x Xi
h

where n is the total number of observations, h is the bandwith, and the function K is
chosen as to minimize the mean integrated square error. There are two choices to take
when using this type of non-parametric estimators: The smoothing function, K (), and
the bandwith, h. We consider the Epanechnikov function of the form,
K

x Xi
h

=
8><>:
3
4
p
5

1  15

x Xi
h
2
if
x Xih  < p5
0 otherwise
We take as bandwith,
h =
0:9m
n1=5
where m = min

x;
igrx
1:349

where igrx is the interquartile range of x, that is the di¤erence between the 75th per-
centile and the 25th percentile.
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